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Religion, Politics, and Beyond 
The Pussy Riot Case 
Davor Džalto, Institute for the Study of Culture and Christianity, Belgrade, 
Serbia 
Abstract 
The recent case of the Russian punk group Pussy Riot, their performance in Moscow 
Cathedral and the subsequent legal actions against them, have highlighted many important 
issues that Russian society faces today. However, this case can also be the basis for a more 
general analysis of the relations of religion and politics and the political dimension of 
Orthodox Christianity.  
Examining the relationship between religion and politics can point to two important 
elements that both religion and politics, in their institutional manifestations, share: 1) the 
“will to power,” and 2) the communitarian dimension of human existence. In order to fully 
understand the paradoxical position of Christianity in respect to politics and state, it is 
necessary to differentiate between “eschatological” and “historical” Christianity. 
An Essay 
I want to begin my essay on religion and politics referring to a very recent event. It is a 
political provocation by a previously marginal and mostly unknown punk group, Pussy Riot. The 
provocation took place earlier this year (2012), triggering the process against its members. It 
is my hope that an analysis of this important case will lead to a deeper insight into the 
relations between religion and politics.  
The reason for the trial against Pussy Riot was its performance in the Moscow Cathedral 
of Christ the Savior, staged on February 21, 2012. The performance was a punk “prayer” to 
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the Mother of God to “chase Putin out.” The space right in front of the iconostasis served as a 
ready-made stage for this performance. The response of the authorities was predictably 
harsh. The three members of the band, Yekaterina Samutsevich, Maria Alyokhina, and 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, were arrested and accused of “hooliganism motivated by religious 
hatred.” 
I will focus on their closing statements, which were delivered on August 8, 2012, before 
the court sentenced each of them to two years in prison on August 17, 2012.1 In these 
intellectually refined statements, they explain the main intentions of their performance, 
putting it in the broader context of Russian society and Orthodox Christianity.  
The Closing Statements 
At the very beginning of her statement, Yekaterina Samutsevich explains the reasons for 
choosing the Cathedral of Christ the Savior for their performance. She perceives the 
cathedral as an important symbol of political power in Russia since the current patriarch 
Kyrill took office. This claim is a platform upon which she develops her brief but very 
insightful analysis of “Orthodox aesthetics” that she contends are used for political purposes 
by the Kremlin’s current administration. The question she starts with is, “Why did Putin feel 
the need to exploit the Orthodox religion and its aesthetic?” and continues: 
After all, he could have employed his own, far more secular tools of power – 
for example, the state-controlled corporations, or his menacing police 
system, or his obedient judicial system. It may be that the harsh, failed 
policies of Putin’s government, the incident with the submarine Kursk, the 
bombings of civilians in broad daylight, and other unpleasant moments in his 
political career forced him to ponder the fact that it was high time to resign; 
that otherwise, the citizens of Russia would help him do this. Apparently, it 
was then that he felt the need for more persuasive, transcendent guarantees 
of his long tenure at the pinnacle of power. It was then that it became 
necessary to make use of the aesthetic of the Orthodox religion, which is 
historically associated with the heyday of Imperial Russia, where power came 
not from earthly manifestations such as democratic elections and civil 
society, but from God Himself. 
It is interesting that Yekaterina employs aesthetical vocabulary in the context of politics, 
power, and religion. She does not point primarily to the institution of the church or the 
spectrum of popular beliefs as the way the current administration makes use of Orthodox 
Christianity, but rather to the “aesthetics of the Orthodox religion” that had been absent 
from the public sphere during communist times. According to Yekaterina, this space, which 
was left by the expulsion of the church and Christianity since the Bolsheviks, could be and, 
in fact, is being used for Putin’s political aims:  
Here, apparently, the authorities took advantage of a certain deficit of the 
Orthodox aesthetic in Soviet times, when the Orthodox religion had an aura 
of lost history, of something that had been crushed and damaged by the 
                                                 
1 The court released Yekaterina Samutsevich in October 2012.  
Religion, Politics, and Beyond 
 
Journal of Religion & Society 3 15 (2013) 
Soviet totalitarian regime, and was thus an opposition culture. The authorities 
decided to appropriate this historical effect of loss and present a new political 
project to restore Russia’s lost spiritual values, a project that has little to do 
with a genuine concern for the preservation of Russian Orthodoxy’s history 
and culture. It was also fairly logical that the Russian Orthodox Church, 
given its long mystical ties to power, emerged as the project’s principal 
exponent in the media. It was decided that, unlike in the Soviet era, when the 
church opposed, above all, the brutality of the authorities toward history 
itself, the Russian Orthodox Church should now confront all pernicious 
manifestations of contemporary mass culture with its concept of diversity 
and tolerance. Implementing this thoroughly interesting political project has 
required considerable quantities of professional lighting and video 
equipment, air time on national television for hours-long live broadcasts, and 
numerous background shoots for morally and ethically edifying news stories, 
where the Patriarch’s well-constructed speeches would in fact be presented, 
thus helping the faithful make the correct political choice during a difficult 
time for Putin preceding the election. Moreover, the filming must be 
continuous; the necessary images must be burned into the memory and 
constantly updated; they must create the impression of something natural, 
constant, and compulsory. 
From this passage we learn how “religious aesthetics” serves political purposes. It is 
both the aesthetical properties of certain religious expressions (Yekaterina points to their 
“aura” and “mysticism,” but one could also add other explicit aesthetical aspects, such as 
liturgical rituals, icons, incense, and so forth) and the aesthetical exploitation of some aspects 
of religious practices through mass-media that make “religious aesthetics” useful for wider 
social and political goals. However, it seems that, according to Yekaterina, it is not only that 
the political establishment makes use of the church, but that the very institution of the 
church (personified here in the figure of the Patriarch) willingly accepts its new role within 
the changed social context. It seems that the church, as an institution, perceives itself as a 
natural ally of the current regime. Supreme political authorities have been interpreted as 
symbols, maybe even the very embodiment of Russia, Russian history, and Russian people, 
which is a view deeply rooted in the imperial Russian tradition. This, in return, gives the 
church a prominent social position and increases its influence. Thus, the state-church deal is 
mutually beneficial. The state and its authorities obtain more than they could possibly obtain 
from other allies; they obtain “blessings,” “aura” of the tradition and “glorious past” (though 
it has never actually been that glorious for the common people), and even metaphysical 
foundations.  
Toward the end of her exposé, Yekaterina addresses the reasons why Pussy Riot’s action, 
which did not involve any sort of violence, provoked such a brutal response. This, in her 
view, also has to do with aesthetics: 
Our sudden musical appearance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior with 
the song ‘Mother of God, Drive Putin Out’ violated the integrity of the 
media image that the authorities had spent such a long time generating and 
maintaining, and revealed its falsity. In our performance we dared, without 
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the Patriarch’s blessing, to unite the visual imagery of Orthodox culture with 
that of protest culture, thus suggesting that Orthodox culture belongs not 
only to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch, and Putin, but that it 
could also ally itself with civic rebellion and the spirit of protest in Russia. 
Perhaps the unpleasant, far-reaching effect of our media intrusion into the 
cathedral was a surprise to the authorities themselves. At first, they tried to 
present our performance as a prank pulled by heartless, militant atheists. This 
was a serious blunder on their part, because by then we were already known 
as an anti-Putin feminist punk band that carried out its media assaults on the 
country’s major political symbols. 
In the end, considering all the irreversible political and symbolic losses 
caused by our innocent creativity, the authorities decided to protect the 
public from us and our nonconformist thinking. This ended our complicated 
punk adventure in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. 
The key point here is the fact that Pussy Riot “dared . . . to unite the visual imagery of 
Orthodox culture with that of protest culture, thus suggesting that Orthodox culture belongs 
not only to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch, and Putin, but that it could also ally 
itself with civic rebellion and the spirit of protest.” This is, in many respects, a “subversive” 
perspective compared to the dominant, traditionalistic view of the role and place of the 
Church within Russian society. The common (mis)interpretation of church-society-state 
relations makes the church a political and national institution, closely tied to the ethnicity, 
national history, tradition, and, not least, the ruler (e.g., emperor). This interpretation is 
grounded in a long history of church-state relations, which goes back to the fourth century 
and the attempts of Roman emperors to embrace the church and the faith, making it an 
important political factor.2 The history of Byzantine and, later, Russian empires managed to 
construct a narrative in which the church and the state (later also the entire ethnical/national 
community) grow together, reflecting, in the ideal case, the state of “symphony” between the 
“heavenly” (church) and the “earthly” (state) spheres. Rather than any justifiable Orthodox 
theological position, this concept primarily reflects the power quest on both sides. In other 
words, we do not deal here with two distinct spheres, but rather with various power 
structures that operate within one and the same sphere; the target on both sides is to gain 
social, financial and political power. In such a narrative, there is no clear distinction between 
mystical domains and political actions, between national interests and (pseudo) Christian 
faith. It is natural that in such an atmosphere any call for different views, or critiques of the 
monopoly that official church and state structures claim, in both religious and political 
domains, provoke violent responses. This leads to a paradoxical situation in which 
Christianity, the faith of freedom, love, personal consciousness and responsibility, is used to 
justify political oppression and in which a certain class has control of the religious domain 
and of religious truths and their practical manifestations.  
                                                 
2 More on the relations between Orthodox Church and state, especially in respect to the Byzantine times, see 
McGuckin. 
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To be fair, one has to admit that there is nothing uniquely “Christian” or “Orthodox” in 
these developments. It is the nature of political institutions (and religious institutions are 
often among them) to exercise power and spread their influence as much as possible. Many 
different ideological narratives (religious, political, even scientific ones) can be employed to 
achieve these goals. We find the same story, although in very different cultural and social 
contexts, in Western Christianity and in the Muslim world, not to mention theocracies of 
earlier times. The reason why these tendencies are less visible and less dangerous in more 
democratic societies is the long historical struggle to build democratic institutions and 
procedures that protect individual and group freedoms and rights by placing state authorities 
under public control. However, even then we witness the difficult process of separating 
politically useful religious narratives from the sphere of public policy.3  
Orthodoxy, its relation to civic initiatives, rebellion, protests and personal responsibility, 
is the topic with which Yekaterina closes her statement. It becomes the focus of Maria 
Alyokhina’s speech. She comments on the distribution of power in contemporary Russia, as 
the goal of Pussy Riot’s intervention:  
And it is interesting that our situation was depersonalized from the start. This 
is because when we talk about Putin, we have in mind first and foremost not 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin but Putin the system that he himself created – 
the power vertical, where all control is carried out effectively by one person. 
And that power vertical is uninterested, completely uninterested, in the 
opinion of the masses. And what worries me most of all is that the opinion 
of the younger generations is not taken into consideration. We believe that 
the ineffectiveness of this administration is evident in practically everything. 
Maria sees the roots of these complex social and political problems in the system of 
education. It is the very system that ignores and, to a significant extent, abandons individual 
approach and individual responsibilities: 
Our schooling, which is where the personality begins to form in a social 
context, effectively ignores any particularities of the individual. There is no 
“individual approach,” no study of culture, of philosophy, of basic 
knowledge about civic society. Officially, these subjects do exist, but they are 
still taught according to the Soviet model. And as a result, we see the 
marginalization of contemporary art in the public consciousness, a lack of 
motivation for philosophical thought, and gender stereotyping. The concept 
of the human being as a citizen gets swept away into a distant corner.4 
                                                 
3 The case of United States is particularly telling in this respect. For more on how religious fundamentalism has 
been articulated and adopted in public policy, see Chomsky.  
4 This is where Slavoj Žižek is, in my view, mistaken when he interprets their masks as a sign of “de-
individualization”: “This is why they wear balaclavas: masks of de-individualization, of liberating anonymity. The 
message of their balaclavas is that it doesn’t matter which of them got arrested – they’re not individuals, they’re 
an Idea. And this is why they are such a threat: it is easy to imprison individuals, but try to imprison an Idea!” I 
think that it is precisely this personal consciousness that Maria affirms; the masks are there to expose the other 
side’s mask, that of the state authorities and the entire society which wears hypocritical masks, hiding from 
their personal responsibilities.  
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For Maria, education is directly connected to the problem of freedom. Children are 
instructed to give up their free initiatives and individual responsibilities: “beginning in 
childhood, we forget our freedom.” Maria’s analysis is certainly right in pointing to the 
correlation between the level of individual freedoms and the magnitude of civic initiatives (at 
least in the societies with strong state apparatus). Undermining freedom is directly related to 
obedience as the desired mode of behavior, which results in the fear and lack of civic 
initiatives. Moreover, the very notion of “citizen” (as compared to the amorphous “people” 
or “nation”) requires affirmation of individual freedom and consciousness:  
Why should they care if the wife of our Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
wants to build an official residence there and destroy the only juniper 
preserve in Russia? . . . This is yet another confirmation that people in our 
country have lost the sense that this country belongs to us, its citizens. They 
no longer have a sense of themselves as citizens. They have a sense of 
themselves simply as the automated masses. They don’t feel that the forest 
belongs to them, even the forest located right next to their houses. I doubt 
they even feel a sense of ownership over their own houses. Because if 
someone were to drive up to their porch with a bulldozer and tell them that 
they need to evacuate, that, ‘Excuse us, we’re going raze your house to make 
room for a bureaucrat’s residence,’ these people would obediently collect 
their belongings, collect their bags, and go out on the street. And then stay 
there precisely until the regime tells them what they should do next. They are 
completely shapeless, it is very sad. Having spent almost half a year in jail, I 
have come to understand that prison is just Russia in miniature. . . There is 
absolutely no horizontal delegation of duties, which would make everyone’s 
lives noticeably easier. And there is a lack of individual initiative. 
In her view, this is what makes the entire society one giant jail that affirms authoritarian 
modes of behavior: “In jail and all over the country, people don’t know where to turn with 
this or that question. That’s why they turn to the boss of the jail. And outside the prison, 
correspondingly, they go to Putin, the top boss.”  
A reference to “jail” has a special significance in this context. Jail is not only the physical 
place where the sword of justice sends those who violated the (legitimate) law. It is also a 
metaphor for the lack of freedom in individual and public life. In totalitarian societies and in 
societies without functioning democracy (although they might have many democratic 
institutions and procedures), jail is also a place for those who have “problematic” opinions, 
attitudes, and behavior. At the same time, jail has been the means for making both true and 
false heroes and dissidents. Maria thus aptly quotes Vladimir Bykovsky and his statement: 
“How unfortunate is the country where simple honesty is understood, in the best case, as 
heroism. And in the worst case as a mental disorder.” “Mental disorder,” just as committing 
fabricated “crimes,” has been an effective means of control and indoctrination. The history 
of this kind of political pressure against dissidents and independent intellectuals begins with 
the persecution of Old Testament prophets, continues with the persecution of Socrates and 
Jesus, and includes modern intellectuals and dissidents such as Mahatma Gandhi, Julian 
Assange, and many others unknown to the broader audience. 
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This analysis of the social and political situation in Russia leads Maria to an analysis of 
Christian motives that lie behind their action. Contrary to what the media and official church 
and state representatives wanted to portray, Maria depicts the Pussy Riot action as rooted in 
Christianity and, in particular, Orthodoxy. She looks for religious foundations of human 
freedom:  
I would like to note that this method of personal development clearly 
impedes the awakening of both inner and religious freedoms, unfortunately, 
on a mass scale. The consequence of the process I have just described is 
ontological humility, existential humility, socialization. To me, this transition, 
or rupture, is noteworthy in that, if approached from the point of view of 
Christian culture, we see that meanings and symbols are being replaced by 
those that are diametrically opposed to them. Thus one of the most 
important Christian concepts, Humility, is now commonly understood not as 
a path towards the perception, fortification, and ultimate liberation of Man, 
but on the contrary as an instrument for his enslavement. To quote [Russian 
philosopher] Nikolai Berdyaev, one could say that ‘the ontology of humility 
is the ontology of the slaves of God, and not the sons of God.’ When I was 
involved with organizing the ecological movement, I became fundamentally 
convinced of the priority of inner freedom as the foundation for taking 
action. As well as the importance, the direct importance, of taking action as 
such. 
She even connects their motives with the Gospel: “Our motivation is . . . best expressed 
in the Gospels: ‘For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one 
who knocks, the door will be opened’ [Matthew 7: 8]. I – all of us – sincerely believe that for 
us the door will be opened.” In her conclusion, Maria stresses the character of their action 
and the positions they take in connection to Christianity more strongly than in any of their 
previous claims: 
I believe that we are being accused by people without memory. Many of 
them have said, “He is possessed by a demon and insane. Why do you listen 
to Him?’ These words belong to the Jews who accused Jesus Christ of 
blasphemy. They said, ‘We are . . . stoning you . . . for blasphemy” [John 10: 
33]. Interestingly enough, it is precisely this verse that the Russian Orthodox 
Church uses to express its opinion about blasphemy. This view is certified on 
paper, it’s attached to our criminal file. Expressing this opinion, the Russian 
Orthodox Church refers to the Gospels as static religious truth. The Gospels 
are no longer understood as revelation, which they have been from the very 
beginning, but rather as a monolithic chunk that can be disassembled into 
quotations to be shoved in wherever necessary – in any of its documents, for 
any of their purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church did not even bother to 
look up the context in which ‘blasphemy’ is mentioned here – that in this 
case, the word applies to Jesus Christ himself. I think that religious truth 
should not be static, that it is essential to understand the instances and paths 
of spiritual development, the trials of a human being, his duplicity, his 
splintering. 
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It is Nadezhda Tolokonnikova’s closing statement that most strongly stresses 
Christianity and Orthodoxy. She even characterizes their “punk” action as a form of 
yurodstvo, which has deep roots in the Christian tradition, especially in Russia: 
Pussy Riot’s performances can either be called dissident art or political action 
that engages art forms. Either way, our performances are a kind of civic 
activity amidst the repressions of a corporate political system that directs its 
power against basic human rights and civil and political liberties. The young 
people who have been flayed by the systematic eradication of freedoms 
perpetrated through the aughts have now risen against the state. We were 
searching for real sincerity and simplicity, and we found these qualities in the 
yurodstvo [the holy foolishness] of punk. . . Passion, total honesty, and naïveté 
are superior to the hypocrisy, mendacity, and false modesty that are used to 
disguise crime. The so-called leading figures of our state stand in the 
Cathedral with righteous faces on, but, in their cunning, their sin is greater 
than our own. 
She also refers to information they received about the support they have among many 
of the faithful Orthodox Christians, who pray for them: 
This fact alone demonstrates that there is no single, unified group of 
Orthodox believers, as the prosecutor would like to prove. This unified 
group does not exist. Today, more and more believers have come to the 
defense of Pussy Riot. They don’t think that what we did warrants a five-
month term in a pretrial detention center, let alone three years in prison, as 
the prosecutor has called for. Every day, more people understand that if the 
system is attacking three young women who performed in the Cathedral of 
Christ the Savior for thirty seconds with such vehemence, it only means that 
this system fears the truth, sincerity, and straightforwardness we represent. 
We have never used cunning during these proceedings. Meanwhile, our 
opponents are too often cunning, and people sense this. Indeed, the truth 
has an ontological, existential superiority over deception, and this is 
described in the Bible, particularly the Old Testament. 
Nadezhda (which translates as Hope) continues in an almost prophetic manner, claiming 
that “the paths of truth always triumph over the paths of cunning, guile, and deception.” 
Truth, in her view, is something both ontological and something that has to do with 
knowledge and (rational) understanding:  
I don’t want to label anyone. It seems to me that there are no winners, losers, 
victims, or defendants here. We all simply need to reach each other, connect, 
and establish a dialogue in order to seek out the truth together. Together, we 
can seek wisdom and be philosophers, instead of stigmatizing people and 
labeling them. That is the last thing a person should do. Christ condemned it. 
With this trial, the system is abusing us. Who would have thought that man 
and the state he rules could, again and again, perpetrate absolutely 
unmotivated evil? . . . I believe that every person should strive for this, and 
not only those who have studied in some philosophy department. A formal 
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education means nothing, although prosecution attorney Pavlova constantly 
attempts to reproach us for our lack of education. We believe the most 
important thing is to strive, to strive towards knowledge and understanding. 
This is what a person can achieve independently, outside the walls of an 
educational institution. Regalia and scholarly degrees mean nothing. A person 
can possess a great deal of knowledge, but not be a human being. Pythagoras 
said extensive knowledge does not breed wisdom. 
Nadezhda puts their position vis-à-vis the regime in relation to political dissidents and 
innocent martyrs from the Christian past, those who were also persecuted by religious and 
state authorities: 
Do you remember why young Dostoyevsky was sentenced to death? His 
entire guilt lay in the fact that he was fascinated by socialist theories, and 
during meetings of freethinkers and friends – which met on Fridays in the 
apartment of [Mikhail] Petrashevsky – he discussed the writings of Fourier 
and George Sand. On one of the last Fridays, he read Belinsky’s letter to 
Gogol aloud, a letter that was filled, according to the court that tried 
Dostoevsky (listen!) “with impudent statements against the Orthodox 
Church and the State government.” After all the preparations for execution 
and “ten agonizing, infinitely terrifying minutes awaiting death” 
(Dostoyevsky), it was announced that the sentence was changed to four years 
of hard labor in Siberia followed by military service. Socrates was accused of 
corrupting the youth with his philosophical discussions and refusing to 
accept the Athenian gods. . . Have you forgotten under what circumstances 
Stephen, the disciple of the Apostles, concluded his earthly life? “Then they 
secretly induced men to say, “We have heard him speak blasphemous words 
against Moses and against God.” And they stirred up the people, the elders 
and the scribes, and they came up to him and dragged him away and brought 
him before the Council. They put forward false witnesses who said, “This 
man incessantly speaks against this holy place and the Law” [Acts 6:11-13]. 
He was found guilty and stoned to death. I also hope that you all remember 
well how the Jews answered Christ: “It is not for good works that we are 
going to stone you but for blasphemy” [John 10:33]. And finally we would do 
well to keep in mind the following characterization of Christ: “He is demon-
possessed and raving mad” [John 10:20]. 
The Response of Intellectuals  
Many “regime intellectuals” in Russia have, predictably, attacked Pussy Riot and their 
action as “stupidity,” “hooliganism,” “blasphemy,” and even “conspiracy” against Russia and 
the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus Sergei Markov explains: “Pussy Riot’s act inside the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior is not the stupidity of young girls, but part of the global 
conspiracy against Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. According to this version [of 
events], Putin isn’t obliged to just punish three idiots in a fatherly way, but also protect 
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Russia from this conspiracy with all possible severity” (Elder).5 This is typical of 
(semi)totalitarian societies; victims are accused of violence and sins against the state and 
“national interest.” Accusations of “conspiracies” of various sorts are a typical way to 
denounce the enemy and, if possible, destroy their credibility. The fact that Pussy Riot 
members explicitly stated, just a day after the performance, that they “respect religion in 
general and the Orthodox faith in particular,” and that they “are especially infuriated when 
Christian philosophy, which is full of light, is used in such a dirty fashion,” which makes 
them “sick to see such beautiful ideas forced to their knees,” seems to have no relevance nor 
resonance. Obedience to the master(s) is obviously the priority over the moral integrity and 
intellectual credibility, not to mention Christian consciousness.  
Politics as Religion – Religion as Politics 
Pussy Riot’s action was a successful provocation that highlighted many current issues 
within Russian society. However, their action can also be the basis for a more general 
analysis of religion-politics relations and of the political dimension of Orthodox Christianity. 
The case makes us think of how deeply religious institutions and state authorities can be 
intertwined. We are also compelled to ask, from the point of view of Orthodox theology, if 
the dominant and traditional understanding of the relations between the state, society, and 
Orthodoxy is correct.  
To think of religion and politics is to face a paradox. On the one hand, it might seem 
that religion and politics do not have much, if anything, in common. Many would argue that 
politics and religion are fundamentally different and, in many aspects, even opposite spheres 
of human endeavor; they belong to different mindsets that should not be confused under 
any circumstances. Following this argument, religion is related to metaphysical and sacred 
things, questions about afterlife, religious rituals and so on. The political sphere refers 
primarily to power, legal (or illegal) violence, economy, administration, and other “earthly” 
and usually not particularly pleasant things.  
On the other hand, history demonstrates the frequent interrelationship between religion 
and politics, both in the Christian and non-Christian world. Even today across the planet we 
witness the rise of political ideologies that seek religious justification. We also notice the rise 
of religious fundamentalism, which is nothing but a battle for political goals with the help of 
formally religious ideals, teachings and practices. These processes, to make the whole image 
even more puzzling, take place in both developing and developed industrial countries in an 
                                                 
5 Another example is Aleksandar Dugin’s analysis of Pussy Riot’s action in an interview for the media house 
Russia.ru. He perceives it as an attack on the “Byzantine model of government,” which also became the 
traditional model of government in Russia. This model, in his view, affirms an alliance between “spiritual” and 
secular powers. Since this is the traditional “Orthodox” and “organic” model of government, any attack on this 
model is an attack on Russia, Russian tradition and Orthodoxy. However, one must admit that the role of 
intellectuals in supporting the dominant ideology and political order crosses the boundaries of post-communist 
countries. One can argue that the role of “official intellectuals” is, in fact, basically the same everywhere. In 
contrast to dissident intellectuals and critical thinkers, “official intellectuals” serve to provide a conceptual 
framework to the dominant order of power, supporting that way the ruling elites. They promptly criticize 
atrocities and violations of human rights somewhere else while forgetting, however, to raise their voice against 
attacks on basic human and civil rights in their own countries. The apparent political persecution of Julian 
Assange for his actions in the domains of freedom of information and democracy is telling in this respect. 
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age during which we have started to think that the time of religion and its strong social and 
political influence is past.  
How can this relation be articulated from a Christian and, specifically, Orthodox 
Christian point of view?  
To properly clarify the relation between politics and Christianity it seems necessary to 
make a clear distinction between what Nikolai Berdyaev calls “eschatological” and 
“historical” Christianity.6 The former is charismatic, prophetic, and radical in its personalism 
and in the search for human freedom and creativity. The latter belongs to “this world” and 
its history, to the state of necessity in which it is compelled to make compromises with the 
“world.” The first draws its strength from eschatological expectations, the second from the 
feeling of security within “this world” and its powers.  
This distinction helps us understand that we can draw two very different, even opposite, 
Christian approaches to politics. It is, thus, not a surprise that “historical” Christianity has 
suffered from the same deviations that we find in the “world” within particular historical, 
social, and political contexts. Historical and institutional Christianity has many similarities 
with political institutions. They share the same will to power, a concept I use to describe a 
human readiness to dominate other human beings in a structured and institutionalized way. 
Political agents and authorities demonstrate this will to power when they exercise 
unjustifiable domination and, if necessary, repress people in a particular society with 
instruments they possess. The will to power makes religious institutions act quite similarly to 
other social and political institutions. Church and state are thus natural allies when their 
interests in pursuing power are complementary, and natural opponents when their intentions 
to spread power and influence conflict.  
There is, however, another, more complex similarity between religion and politics. It is 
the communitarian dimension of human existence that they both affirm and exploit. The 
communal dimension of human beings is manifested at various levels – family, professional 
groups, ethnicities, nations, religions, and so forth. However, from an Orthodox Christian 
perspective, particular collectives and identities that belong to the social and political sphere 
are merely symbols of a much deeper, ontological aspect of human existence. Ontologically 
speaking, human beings are primarily beings of communion; they do not exist as individuals 
that later become members of a certain collective. The communal dimension of human 
existence is a constitutive aspect of each person. In other words, there is no particular 
human existence outside the communion of love. There is no “I” without “you” and 
“them.” Being in communion, to paraphrase the title of a famous book by John Zizioulas, is 
what constitutes a particular and unique identity of each human being.  
I will not develop this complex and interesting topic further, which is related to basic 
Christian dogmatic presuppositions. What I want to point out is simply that the 
communitarian dimension of human existence is often misused for political and ideological 
                                                 
6 “My interpretation of Christianity is eschatological and I place it in antithesis to historical Christianity” 
(Berdyaev: 243).  
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purposes. The most remarkable cases of pseudo-metaphysical Christian interpretations of 
the communitarian dimension are found in attempts to supply national or ethnic collectives 
with an aura of “sacredness.” Such Christianity-based nationalisms appear to be successful 
ideologies because people find in them surrogates for the communion of persons as a 
metaphysical reality based on freedom. The fascination with particular ideologies, social 
collectives, and political narratives poses a huge threat to human freedom and authentic 
human relations. Instead of being what they are supposed to be – practical and functional 
categories – social and political collectives paradoxically become transformed into 
metaphysical categories. This happens when metaphysical or mystical foundations are used 
to support politically-utilitarian constructs such as states or nations. This is precisely what is 
at stake in the Pussy Riot case. Their action provoked a brutal response precisely because they 
targeted this pseudo-ecclesial dimension of the current Russian state-church policy.  
After the French Revolution, many believed that the decline of the close relationship 
between state and church, politics and religion, was irreversible. Secularization and secular 
states were thought of as vital aspects of modernity and “western progress.” However, the 
separation between state and church, and between politics and religion, has not brought an 
end to close state-church relations, although the meaning of this relation has changed. I do 
not refer here only to special relations between states and churches and religious 
communities specific to each European country, which range from complete separation to 
an official state church. What I have in mind is that particular political constructs, such as 
states and nations, often occupy the space of religion in its public, political manifestation. In 
this case, political agents are given metaphysical and quasi-sacred foundations (e.g., Christian 
monarchies during medieval Europe). This can be seen when states, nations, political 
ideologies, or political leaders are elevated to the level of secular deities and supplemented 
with a quasi-religious “aura.” Even formally democratic and secular systems can be faced 
with almost mystical concepts of “national interests,” “our way of life,” “defense,” and so 
forth, that allow and justify even the most terrifying actions by such states and their armed 
forces. Modern states often behave as cruel gods that require human sacrifices, whether 
domestic or foreign, to be satisfied in order to bring their citizens “peace” and “prosperity.”  
Giving a “sacred” aura to society and the political sphere, whether these intentions 
come from political authorities or religious institutions, is a certain way to secularize the 
religious sphere and make the Church just another organization of “this world.” On the 
contrary, to preserve the sacred character of religion it seems necessary to secularize society 
and its institutions (e.g., states), to make them practical and “user-friendly” for its members 
and the global community.  
An Eschatological Christian Perspective  
 The problem with each attempt to construct an Orthodox Christian political 
theology is the eschatological character of the Christian faith. Christians see in the eschaton and 
the Kingdom of God the only “real” reality, the only perfect community and order, which is 
based on love rather than on external authorities and power. From a Christian perspective, 
there will be no ideal social or political system in the course of human history; all historical 
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social and political systems are imperfect and sometimes even contrary to a Christian 
understanding of what and who the human being is.7  
 However, in the mean time, until the eschaton, Orthodox Christians are called to make 
their society and inter-human relations as human as possible. I believe that it is important to 
strengthen civil society with various local “bottom-up” initiatives, and to support real 
democratic capacities, procedures, the rule of law, and other institutions that do not have 
metaphysical significance per se but certainly make life more civilized and more humane. 
Solutions to important social and political problems that even the most advanced societies 
face today do not necessarily require religion, but they certainly require solidarity and 
responsibility. Orthodox Christians should seek to do good things, not because it is required 
by any ethical or social norms and standards, but because it is a manifestation of their mode of 
existence and their testimony to the coming Kingdom of God. 
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